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## 1

#### Intellectualism and post-structural analysis breads inaction and diverts the focus from the international stage—this makes exercising hegemony impossible

**Willis, 95** – Professor of Journalism & Director of Concentraion in Cultural Reporting and Criticism at NYU, 12-19-95 (Ellen, The Village Voice)//VP

If intellectuals are more inclined to rise to the discrete domestic issue than the historic international moment, this may have less to do with the decay of the notion of international solidarity than with the decay of confidence in their ability to change the world, not to mention the decay of anything resembling a coherent framework of ideas within which to understand it. Certainly the received ideas of the left, to the extent that a left can still be said to exist, have been less than helpful as a framework for understanding the Bosnian crisis or organizing a response to it. Although the idea of American imperialism explains less and less in a world where the locus of power is rapidly shifting to a network of transnational corporations, it still fuels a strain of reflexive anti-interventionist sentiment whose practical result is paralyzed dithering in the face of genocide. Floating around "progressive" circles and reinforcing the dithering is a brand of vulgar pacifism whose defining characteristic is not principled rejection of violence but squeamish aversion to dealing with it. In the academy in particular, entrenched assumptions about identity politics and cultural relativism promote a view of the Balkan conflict as too complicated and ambiguous to allow for choosing sides. If there is no such thing as universality, if multiethnic democracy is not intrinsically preferable to ethnic separatism, if there are no clear-cut aggressors and victims but merely clashing cultures, perhaps ethnic partition is simply the most practical way of resolving those "implacable ancient rivalries."

#### Their musings of utopian societies drain support for hegemony—and we’ll indict their methodology—their K is so deep within the ivory tower that it can’t even access society

**Hanson, 03** (Victor Davis, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, Ph.D. from Stanford, “We Could Still Lose.” National Review Online. August 11. http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3050721.html.)//VP

If one were to collate the news reports about the Mosul shootout, the lessons would be as follows: read two mass killers their Miranda rights; dodge their bullets when they shoot first; capture them alive; let Europeans cross-examine them in the Hague; lose no friendlies in the operation; do not disturb the residents next door; protect the Husseins’ victims from such oppressors (but without cracking their plaster); and in general remember that the entire scene will be filmed and then broadcast as *Cops* rather than as *Hell Is for Heroes*. I am not suggesting that we ignore the real dangers involved in ethnic profiling or discount the moral issues that arise from killing our enemy leaders and disseminating gross pictures of their corpses. And, of course, we *should* seek to distinguish Baathist culprits from ordinary Iraqis. My point is rather that, because we are products of an affluent and leisured West, we have a special burden to remember how tenuous and fragile civilization remains outside our suburbs. Most of us don’t fear much from the fatwa of a murderous mullah, and few have had our sisters shredded before our eyes in one of Uday’s brush chippers—much less ever seen chemical warfare trucks hosing down our block, in the same way that crop dusters fogged our backyards. Instead, we have the leisure to engage in utopian musing, assured that our economy, our unseen soldiers, or our system working on autopilot will always ensure us such prerogatives. And in the la-la land of Washington and New York, it is especially easy to forget that we are not even like our own soldiers in Iraq, now sleeping outside without toilets and air conditioners, eating dehydrated food, and trying to distinguish killers from innocents. What does all this mean? Western societies from ancient Athens to imperial Rome to the French republic rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or because foreign enemies proved too numerous or formidable in arms—even when those enemies were grim Macedonians or Germans. Rather, in times of peace and prosperity there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an intellectual arrogance that for some can be the unfortunate by-product of an enlightened society. I think we are indulging in this unreal hypercriticism—even apart from the election season antics of our politicians—because we are not being gassed or shot or even left hot or hungry. September 11 no longer evokes an image of incinerated firefighters, innocents leaping out of skyscrapers, or the stench of flesh and melted plastic but rather squabbles over architectural designs, lawsuits, snarling over John Ashcroft’s new statutes, or concerns about being too rude to the Arab street. Such smug dispensation—as profoundly amoral as it is—provides us, on the cheap and at a safe distance, with a sense of moral worth. Or perhaps censuring from the bleachers enables us to feel superior to those less fortunate who are still captive to their primordial appetites. We prefer to cringe at the thought that others like to see proof of their killers’ deaths, prefer to shoot rather than die capturing a mass murderer, and welcome a generic profile of those who wish to kill them en masse. We should take stock of this dangerous and growing mind-set—and remember that wealthy, sophisticated societies like our own are rarely overrun. They simply implode—whining and debating to the end, even as they pass away.

#### The impact is global warfare

Kagan ‘7, Robert Kagan (Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund) 2007 “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could bedestabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

#### The alternative is a micro-political embrace of hegemony – calling intellectual attention to hegemony in terms of maximizing its productivity incorporates the reasons hegemony may be bad in the squo—their purely anti-institutional politics fail to consider our alternative

**Adolphs and Karakayali, 07** – (Micropolitics and Hegemony, Both Fellows @ European Institute of Progressive Cultural Policies, http://eipcp.net/transversal/0607/adolphs-karakayali/en)//VP

The starting point for this article was our joint reading of the text “1968 and after: Some Comments on Singularity and Minoritarian Politics” by Katja Diefenbach. While we share the orientation to defending the concept of becoming minoritarian against the neo-universalist invectives of authors like Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, reading the article we started reflecting again on the problem of the relationship between becoming and history, between quantum flows and segmentarity. Para-universalism has already been popular for several years. Its proponents are found not only in the camp of the leftists, which includes Badiou and Žižek, among others, but also in all the fields of the political spectrum. Everywhere “difference”, multiculturalism and other misapprehensions are held responsible for the decline of morals, authority and class consciousness, which is ultimately attributed to 1968, the starting point of a more or less lasting revolt, which was distinguished – worldwide – by not allowing itself to be pressed into the templates of the macropolitical. This was also Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis: “those who evaluated things in macropolitical terms understood nothing of the event, because something unaccountable was escaping.” Badiou and Žižek’s criticism is directed against a possibility of emancipative politics that is thought to be lost along with the loss of universal instances. These instances of invoking a subject in religion as in the political are supposed to guarantee a kind of stability against the difference that is bound to the commodity form, has become arbitrary, and they are seen as the inexorable foundation of all political agency. In this kind of critical perspective, the thinking of Deleuze (and others) is exactly in line with this general loss of the political, reinforcing it instead of opposing it. Conversely, there is a broad reading of Deleuze and Guattari that understands micropolitics as a kind of “small scale politics” or anti-institutional politics. This tends to diminish the significance or the effect of the “macropolitical”. In contrast to this, our endeavor is to show that politics can, first of all, not be reduced to these instances, and secondly that micropolitics understood in this way is not capable of eluding appropriation and passivization. Both positions underestimate – albeit for different reasons – the struggles in the fields structured by power technologies and gouvernmental knowledge. This article intends to show that hegemony and micropolitics are not mutually exclusive perspectives, but instead refer to one another. If hegemony is understood following the criticisms of 1968 of the normalizing modes of subjectification as an anti-passive revolution, then the micropolitical perspective offers important indications of an emancipatory project beyond fordist social formations.We argue for a hegemony theory reading of the works by Deleuze and Guattari. In our view this enables reading the endeavor of the two authors, in their writing from *Anti-Oedipus* to *What is Philosophy?*, as a grand attempt to take up the “problematic” of Marxism again and reformulate it on the basis of the battles after 1968. A reading of this kind only makes sense, if the concept of hegemony is liberated from its reduction to a simple “expansion” of the concept of the state. This is a notion that rests on Gramsci’s formula of the state as “hegemony armored with compulsion”, because it still allows thinking of the state as something external. This is also how Deleuze’ statement can be understood, that both of them (not only he) constantly “remained” Marxists – which is also a variation of the assemblage. With a perspective of this kind it could be said that, contrary to a certain reception, concepts like becoming-minoritarian, micropolitics or deterritorialization specifically do not stand for a thinking that is capable of imagining the flight from capital and state only from the catastrophic perspective of their absolute reterritorialization (their destruction, in other words). This is what the recurrent phrase refers to, “a thought that appeals to a people”. Yet can a people even emerge from becoming-minoritarian? Like many others, “people” is also a term borrowed and reinterpreted by Deleuze and Guattari. The fact that becoming-minoritarian is still bound to instances, even if it is not dissolved in them, is exactly the problem that ultimately leads Badiou and Žižek to their conservative revolutionary intervention and to coupling emancipation with religion or ideology and thus with para-universalism. Instead of thinking of becoming as the absolute other of history, which drops out of history, always threatened by meta-narratives that appropriate it, we want to ask how one can imagine historical change and write history without omitting becoming-minoritarian. The question of history principally involves the Deleuzian question of how a new people (that is no longer a people) can be created, if the mass itself speaks, if it is in the process of becoming. It should not be denied that the relations, references and shared problems we postulate are only one side of the coin. Indeed, with our reinterpretation we wish to emphasize this, because they often appear implicit and hidden. The differences, breaks and discontinuities recede more into the background in this article, also for reasons of space. To that extent, our “disposition” of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts with the problematic of hegemony is only a first step that could yield new difficulties, but also a new productivity. This article should therefore be read more in the sense of a pragmatic framework, which we presume to be capable of triggering productive movements. We seek to achieve a translation of the concepts into one another, not a confrontation of models. If the problem of becoming and history is reformulated in terms of hegemony theory, it could be argued that – at the level of a “poetics of knowledge” – the point is to avoid certaiman passivizing intellectual styles (of thinking and writing). What has to be communicated together are narrative strategies of history (history is “narrated”), social science knowledge (i.e. a knowledge about the material constitution of the multitude), and the problem of democracy (the multitude as changing, becoming subjects). The point is a change of language-body-location, which no only accompanies everyone in the place assigned to them, but also changes the arrangement of the locations themselves, a limitation of certain practices and forms of knowledge and a revaluation of others. This problem, which Rancière sought to grasp with a poetics of knowledge, and which Deleuze and Guattari have also faced since their first collaborative book *Anti-Oedipus*, is the same one that is also the starting point of Gramsci’s work. The thesis posed here is thus that the arrangement of knowledge, language and bodies represents the core of the hegemony theory issue. For this kind of reading of the concept of hegemony, hegemony is not a different word for domination, but rather a network of practices of leadership and self-leadership, which in turn builds on a specific division of labor (between intellectual and non-intellectual practices), and which is anchored by standardization and normalization not only in everyday life, but also in the mode of production. It is also in this context that Gramsci develops the concept of the “passive revolution”, i.e. “revolutions” that are responsive to demands from the basis, yet forestall a self-reliant leadership of the subalterns at the same time. In passive revolutions the relations of the political and social division of labor into manual and mental labor are not challenged, but rather modernized or transformed. Passivization leads to a blocking of self-reliant and new institutional forms of state on the part of the subalterns. The question, then, is who leads whom by which (political, mental or economic) means, and how those who are led can liberate themselves from this leadership. Against this background, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony serves to develop a new practice of politics, which has an anti-passive effect.

## 2

#### Cuba is a flagrant, willful, and persistent violator of human rights — repression is worsening

Miami Herald 13 — Miami Herald, 2013 (“Human rights under abuse in Cuba,” Editorial, April 22nd, Available Online at http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/22/3358813/human-rights-under-abuse-in-cuba.html#storylink=cpy, Accessed 07-03-2013)

The State Department’s latest report on human-rights practices effectively puts the lie to the idea that the piecemeal and illusory changes in Cuba under Gen. Raúl Castro represent a genuine political opening toward greater freedom.¶ If anything, things are getting worse. The report, which covers 2012, says the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and Reconciliation counted 6,602 short-term detentions during the year, compared with 4,123 in 2011. In March 2012, the same commission recorded a 30-year record high of 1,158 short-term detentions in a single month just before the visit of Pope Benedict XVI.¶ Among the many abuses cited by the 2012 report are the prison sentences handed out to members of the Unión Patriotica de Cuba, the estimated 3,000 citizens held under the charge of “potential dangerousness,” state-orchestrated assaults against the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White), the suspicious death of dissident Oswaldo Payá and so on.¶ As in any dictatorship, telling the truth is a crime: Independent journalist Calixto Ramón Martínez Arias, the first to report on the cholera outbreak in Cuba, was jailed in September for the crime of desacato (insulting speech) and remained there until last week.¶ The regime is willing to undertake some meek economic reforms to keep people employed. It has even dared to relax its travel requirements to allow more Cubans to leave the country if they can get a passport.¶ Both of these are short-term survival measures, designed as escape valves for growing internal pressure. But when it comes to free speech, political activity and freedom of association — the building blocks of a free society — the report is a depressing chronicle of human-rights abuses and a valuable reminder that repression is the Castro regime’s only response to those who demand a genuinely free Cuba. Fundamental reform? Not a chance.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — moral duty to shun

**Beversluis 89** (Eric H. Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College. “On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions”. Public Affairs Quarterly. 2 April 1989. JSTOR. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435708)//JuneC//](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435708%29//JuneC//)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.¶ **But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected?** In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?¶ We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.¶ Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.¶ Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.¶ An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. ¶ When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?**¶** First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)¶ Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."¶ Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.¶ Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. ¶ We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

## 3

#### The resolution demands advocacy of a federal policy

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action to bolster economic development between countries

Jakstaite, 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential.

#### Competitive debate is a dialogue between two teams. Their refusal to defend the resolution is an act to exclude the negative from meaningful participation in the dialogue. Fairness exists to provide contestation from both sides.

**Galloway, 07** –professor of communication at Samford University (Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, *Contemporary Argumentation and Debate,* Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### **It’s a voting issue and outweighs their offense –**

#### 1) Their attempt to exclude the negative hurts the benefits of in-round dialogue. Fairness norms are vital because they allow both teams to be heard in a meaningful way. Debate as dialogue is vital to refine and develop positions, test ideas and is a prerequisite to meaningful political participation

**Galloway, 07** –professor of communication at Samford University (Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, *Contemporary Argumentation and Debate,* Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

A second reason to reject the topic has to do with its exclusivity. Many teams argue that because topicality and other fairness constraints prevent particular speech acts, debaters are denied a meaningful voice in the debate process. Advocates argue that because the negative excludes a particular affirmative performance that they have also precluded the affirmative team. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it views exclusion as a unitary act of definitional power. However, a dialogical perspective allows us to see power flowing both ways. A large range of affirmative cases necessitates fewer negative strategies that are relevant to the range of such cases. If the affirmative can present any case it desires, the benefits of the research, preparation, and in-depth thinking that go into the creation of negative strategies are diminished, if not eviscerated entirely. The affirmative case is obliged to invite a negative response. In addition, even when the negative strategy is not entirely excluded, any strategy that diminishes argumentative depth and quality diminishes the quality of in-round dialogue. An affirmative speech act that flagrantly violates debate fairness norms and claims that the benefits of the affirmative act supersede the need for such guidelines has the potential of excluding a meaningful negative response, and undermines the pedagogical benefits of the in-round dialogue. The “germ of a response” (Bakhtin, 1990) is stunted. While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the negative response. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude an entire range of negative arguments, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is just that—a ground to stand on, a ground to speak from, a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation. Conversely, in a dialogical exchange, debaters come to realize the positions other than their own have value, and that reasonable minds can disagree on controversial issues. This respect encourages debaters to modify and adapt their own positions on critical issues without the threat of being labeled a hypocrite. The conceptualization of debate as a dialogue allows challenges to take place from a wide variety of perspectives. By offering a stable referent the affirmative must uphold, the negative can choose to engage the affirmative on the widest possible array of “counterwords,” enhancing the pedagogical process produced by debate. Additionally, debate benefits activism by exposing the participants to a wide range of points of view on topics of public importance. A debater starting their career in the fall of 2005 would have debated about China, landmark Supreme Court decisions, Middle East policy, and agricultural policy. It is unsurprising that many debaters contend that debate is one of the most educationally valuable experiences of their lives. Thus, the unique distinctions between debate and public speaking allow debaters the opportunity to learn about a wide range of issues from multiple perspectives. This allows debaters to formulate their own opinions about controversial subjects through an in-depth process of research and testing of ideas. Putting the cart before the horse by assuming that one knows that the resolution is oppressive and cannot be meaningfully affirmed denies debaters the ability to craft a nuanced answer to the question posed by the resolution.

#### 2) **Switch side debate—refusing to defend resolutional government action when affirmative is a failure to consider arguments from a different point of view and constitutes an assertion that one side is always right coupled with the refusal to actually test their claims —just because they chose to run their argument on the aff doesn’t mean that they had too, which shortcircuits their offense.**

#### **3) Vote for the BEST methodology SANS the permutation.**

#### **a) Permutations are illegitimate in this instance -**

#### **b) No predictable stable advocacy – there is no advocacy statement.**

#### **c) Reciprocity - No check on aff ground means there should be check on negative ground – the aff traditionally has had to be topical and the neg counterplan or counteradvocacy ground was checked by being competitive. This restores fairness.**

#### **d) Method focus makes competition impossible – methods can often be combined for multiple. Make the affirmative stake their ground and test their advocacy my testing with a different method.**

#### **e) Err negative on this question – left against left debates are impossible in a world where the aff makes truth statements, leaving the negative to say privilege good or racism good, which is obviously morally reprehensible.**

## Ontic

**Alt causes – Their evidence is about the conception of homeland security – they do not resolve the other ways that the US is going to try and continue the war on terror in places like Iraq.**

**Ontology should be ignored - Ontology focus destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and guiding action**

**Owen 2**

David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate.

#### Realism’s inevitable – interdisciplinary research proves

**Wohlforth 09** - William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### The criticism of the limit of rationalism, universalism and objectivity encourages epistemological pluralism – this is seized on by conservatives to justify and project their radical ideologies.

**Sherry 96** – Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law and the University of Minnesota (Suzanna, Georgetown Law Journal, “The Sleep of Reason,” February 1996, 84 Geo. L.J. 453

We all know the Enlightenment story, but this article recounts -- and criticizes -- the rather surprising ending that is currently in vogue. Once upon a time, reason replaced faith as the guiding epistemology. In response, religion became largely rational itself, questioning the sharp distinction between faith and reason. [n6](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285602121837&returnToKey=20_T10208434889&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.466563.51045007084" \l "n6) Despite occasional upsurges, religiosity of the traditional, pre-Enlightenment, antirational kind gradually diminished in the Western world. Originally pure and acontextual, reason eventually came to encompass pragmatism or practical reason. [n7](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285602121837&returnToKey=20_T10208434889&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.466563.51045007084" \l "n7) For good or ill, the reason and empiricism of the Enlightenment -- modified and expanded by later thinkers -- reigned supreme. Occasional critics were discounted as primitive, naive, or uneducated, and rarely gained a foothold in universities. [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285602121837&returnToKey=20_T10208434889&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.466563.51045007084" \l "n8)The first ripple in this once uncontroversial ending came from French postmodernists, whose ideas were quickly adopted in the 1980s by legal academics on the left. Critical legal scholars, radical feminists, critical race theorists, and gay and lesbian theorists [n9](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285602121837&returnToKey=20_T10208434889&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.466563.51045007084" \l "n9) began to attribute the Enlightenment epistemology to powerful straight white men, to suggest that others might have different and equally valid epistemologies, and to argue for a sort of epistemological pluralism. This approach has more recently been adopted by conservative scholars arguing that we ought to afford religion a more central place in our politics and culture. Enlightenment reason, they suggest, is just one of a number of alternative epistemologies, and there is no justification for privileging it over religious ways of knowing such as faith and revelation.Nor is this all merely abstract philosophical speculation: both the radicals and  [\*455]  the religionists use their critique of the Enlightenment to advocate very real legal change. Questions of epistemology are thus made central to issues of public policy, and the question becomes what sort of epistemology we should use in governance. After first describing the surprising congruence between the left and the right, I will suggest in this article that our history, the basic structure of our government, and serious practical considerations all point to Enlightenment epistemology as the one best suited for public governance.

#### Rejecting securitization destabilizes identity—causes more violence.

**Reinhard 04**

Kenneth Reinhard, Professor of Jewish Studies, UCLA, 2004, UCLA Center for Jewish Studies, “Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor,” http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous –forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

**Threats are real- statistics show horrible death squads and terrorism in Latin America.**

Brysk 3- associate professor of political science at the University of California (Alison, Recovering from State Terror: The Morning After In Latin America, Latin America Research Review, Project Muse)

Death squads have been a long-standing source of violence in Latin America—before, after, and during military rule. Death squads have been precursors and handmaidens of state terror in the Southern Cone and Central America, but more recently vigilantism which may be state-tolerated but is not wholly state-sponsored has emerged in the weak democracies of Central America, the Andes, and Brazil. Bruce Campbell and Arthur Brenner struggle (with limited success) to define the precise [End Page 240] boundaries of death squads as political entities, but they do offer a useful analysis of death-squad activity as a form of "sub-contracting" of state coercion. As such, death squads tend to arise during periods of state-building and critical junctures in modernization, which may occur at different times in different countries. This account assumes a fundamental rationality of political violence, although bounded by cultural context as to the meaning and historical vocabulary of violence. States sub-contract with the informal sector of coercion when they face unusual threats or seek to engineer a fundamental political transformation, but for some reason require "plausible deniability." Unfortunately, the collection does not allow us to generalize as to the determinants of the need for deniability—although the editors offer the hypothesis that increased international human rights pressure on states may ironically push repressive governments towards deniable death squads.¶ Campbell and Brenner undertake a comparative and historical analysis of death-squad activity which is one of the contributions of the volume, but this means that only three of ten chapters focus on Latin America. The appendix shows death squads in many additional Latin American countries, and the editors note that the majority of documented cases have occurred in Latin America. Cynthia Arnson's intensively documented chapter on El Salvador offers a damning indictment of U.S. knowledge and support of death squads, effectively shredding the vestiges of deniability. In a historical chapter with contemporary relevance, Martha K. Huggins chronicles the institutional roots and development of death squads as the informal sector of police violence in Brazil.¶ From the national level, Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer also explore the roots and patterns of repression. Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer use statistical data to provide a comprehensive map of the incidence and impact of state terror in Guatemala. Through their analysis of over 37,000 documented murders and disappearances—a mere fraction of the appalling total—these scientists establish important explanatory patterns, as well as a database of externally verified knowledge to contribute to the recovery of memory. The statistical data are framed by a careful and complete account of the historical context of political violence in Guatemala in a format other quantitative analysts of human rights would do well to emulate. Among other issues, Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer examine the relationship between (mostly urban) death squads and more overt army massacres in the countryside, which follows the patterns suggested above: state threat combined with plausible deniability. They also determine the relative responsibility of state-sponsored forces for 99 percent of the violations reported during a civil war; although the initial recourse to state terror does seem to correspond to increasing insurgent threat, its character was expanded drastically and disproportionately by Ríos Montt. As this study charts late-1970s expansion in the scope of victims [End Page 241] to virtually all peasants in affected regions, we are reminded how a coercive apparatus can take on an apparent life of its own (as it did in the quite distinctive setting of Argentina). Statistics can also chart the shift after the 1982 peak of massive indiscriminate counter-insurgency to a strategy of terror "directed against citizens working to challenge military control and defend the rule of law" (37).

## Onto

**Do not evaluate their value system without first assessing the consequences of its actual implementation. Viewing ethics in isolation is irresponsible & complicit with the evil they criticize.**

**Issac** **2002**.,( Jeffery C. Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington & Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life. PhD Yale University. From “Ends, Means, and Politics.” Dissent Magazine. Volume 49. Issue # 2. Available online @ subscribing institutions using Proquest. Herm

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Discourse on being renders all speech acts useless which causes nihilism- turns solvency

**Rosen, 69**- Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University – 1969 (Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay, P. 45-46)

I have been arguing that ontological speech, in the sense attributed to it by those who follow Heidegger’s distinction between the ontological and ontic, is in fact silence. Ontologistsof this typewish to talk about Being as distinct from beings, and speech will simply not permit this. If this is a defect of speech, and the significance of speech is in the deepest and final sense relative to silence, then there is no reason for what we say or for whether we speak at all, other than the mere fact, although there is equally no reason to keep silent. The result is absurdism or nihilism. Therefore no reason can be given which would justify our falling into such desperate straits. Every fundamental ontological speechof the type in questionisnot just self-refuting but self-canceling.

#### This turns all their impacts – racism, anti-Semitism, and torture are all discussions that become protected by the affs methodology

**Sherry, 96** – Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law and the University of Minnesota

(Suzanna, Georgetown Law Journal, “The Sleep of Reason,” February 1996, 84 Geo. L.J. 453)

The Enlightenment was indeed aptly named. From the darkness that hid anti-Semitism and other forms of religious persecution, the denial of human freedom for the sake of protecting orthodoxy, the inadvertent cruelty of a nature that man could neither comprehend nor tame, and the deliberate unspeakable tortures committed by one religious regime after another, the Enlightenment burst forth and pointed us toward freedom and equality. We have not yet attained either, but we should be cautious before jettisoning the worldview that has brought us this far. The dangers that the epistemology of the Enlightenment gradually defeated remain very real, ready to reappear as soon as reason sleeps. Lest we fall prey to Goya's monsters, let us affirm that the Enlightenment project is not, in either sense of the word, finished -- neither completed nor defeated.

# 2NC

## Ontic

#### Discourse on being renders all speech acts useless which causes nihilism- turns solvency

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## Heg Good K

#### US hegemony prevents global oppression and prevents more war than it causes – all their impacts assume occasional missteps

Jacoby 11 (Jeff – Boston Globe, graduate of George Washington University and the Boston University School of Law, “The world's best policeman”, 6/22, Washington Post, Factiva)//VP

America may be the world's "indispensable nation," as Bill Clinton said in his second inaugural address, but most Americans, most of the time, are uncomfortable with the idea of US global hegemony. John Quincy Adams wrote long ago that America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy." As the polls consistently suggest, that isolationist sentiment still resonates. But in Adams's day America was not the mightiest, wealthiest, and most influential nation on the face of the earth. Today it is. The United States is the world's only superpower, and if we shirk the role of global policeman, no one else will fill it. By nature Americans are not warmongering empire-builders; their uneasiness about dominating other countries reflects a national modesty that in many ways is admirable - and that belies the caricature of Uncle Sam as arrogant bully or "great Satan." Nevertheless, with great power come great responsibilities, and sometimes one of those responsibilities is to destroy monsters: to take down tyrants who victimize the innocent and flout the rules of civilization. If neighborhoods and cities need policing, it stands to reason the world does too. And just as local criminals thrive when cops look the other way, so do criminals on the world stage. Nazi Germany had conquered half of Europe and Japan was brutalizing much of Asia by the time America finally entered World War II. If America hadn't rescued Kuwait from Saddam Hussein in 1990, no one else would have, either. If America hadn't led NATO in halting Serbia's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, no one else would have, either. If America hadn't faced down the Soviet Union during the long years of the Cold War, no one else would have, either - and hundreds of millions of human beings might still be trapped behind the Iron Curtain. There is no realistic alternative to America as the world's policeman. It clearly isn't a job the United Nations can do. Can an organization that makes no distinction between tyranny and democracy rein in the world's monsters? As the UN's bloody trail of failure from Bosnia to Somalia to Rwanda makes clear, UN "peacekeeping" offers no protection against predators. None of this is to say that America-as-Globocop is a perfect solution to the world's ills, nor that the United States hasn't made many grievous mistakes in its actions abroad. But as the historian Max Boot argues, "America's occasional missteps should not lead us to abdicate our indispensable role, any more than the NYPD should stop doing its vital work, simply because cops occasionally do the wrong thing. On balance, the NYPD still does far more good than harm, and so does the United States of America." To say that America must be the world's policeman is not to call for waging endless wars against all the world's bad actors. Police officers carry weapons, but they fire them only infrequently. The cops' main function is not to gun down criminals, but to suppress crime and reduce fear by patrolling the streets and maintaining a visible presence in the community. Similarly, a well-policed world is one with less combat, not more. The purpose of America's nuclear umbrella and its global network of military bases is not to foment war on all fronts, but to prevent it - **by deterring aggression, maintaining the flow of commerce, and upholding human rights**. We don't do it perfectly, not by a long shot. We don't always live up to our own standards, we sometimes confuse police work with social work, and we are often rewarded not with thanks but resentment. A policeman's lot is not a happy one. It is, however, essential. Our world needs a policeman. And whether most Americans like it or not, only their indispensable nation is fit for the job.

#### Sixth, their advocacy can’t generate the critical mass to combat oppression—only hegemony can—also an independent solvency deficit to the aff

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Yet it's indisputably true that Bosnia has inspired no outpouring of public indignation from American or European intellectuals comparable to that surrounding the Spanish Civil War or Vietnam. Even worse--if one takes seriously the idea that a society ought to be able to look to its intellectuals to analyze and interpret events, to examine them in a larger historical and political context--in the U.S. at least (I don't know about Europe) there has been far too little discussion of Bosnia that goes beyond superficial, platitudinous hand-wringing on the one hand, and realpolitikal noodling about strategic options on the other. My purpose in noting this is not to point fingers; while Sontag has earned the right to be righteous, I can't claim that in my own writing and other public activity I've given Bosnia the attention it deserves. In any case, I don't think righteousness gets to the heart of the matter, which is not the flagging of the individual moral conscience but the precarious state of our collective political life. As Sontag recognizes, the Bosnian gap in our public conversation has everything to do with the devolution of politics that has been gathering terrifying speed since 1989. Intellectuals' public embrace of a political issue doesn't come out of nowhere; it reflects a social climate in which a critical mass of people, particularly in the universities and the media, have a sense of urgency about politics in general and the feeling that what they say or do can make a difference.

**US hegemony is crucial to the global economy**

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[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIED)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that "economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability"; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and "we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity...business follows the flag. <43>

**Extinction**

**Royal 10** – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, (Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

#### Rhetoric that questions hegemony weakens its resolve - we must embrace the mantle of the Neoliberal Empire to check every existential and systemic impact.

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Moreover, the USA is invariably portrayed as a reluctant empire that has almost accidentally inherited the capacity for global power projection thanks to the preponderance of power left over from the superpower confrontation. America’s Empire was thus not desired nor sought, but was established almost by default with the extension and consolidation of empire in the post- 11 September era allegedly driven by defensive considerations to bring order to the zone of war within the Third World. Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Adviser, boldly declared that ‘the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11’ signified a major shift in ‘international politics’ with the post-11 September era providing the USA with the opportunity to ‘expand the number of democratic states’ in the Third World. 7 Robert Kaplan explained that there is ‘a positive side to Empire...It’s in some ways the most benign form of order’, as a **globally hegemonic USA provides the best hope there is for peace and stability**. 8 Sebastian Mallaby echoed Kaplan’s themes and argued that, in the post-11 September era, ‘anti-imperialist restraint’ on the part of the USA, which has allegedly characterised its foreign policy since ‘World War II’, is increasingly becoming ‘harder to sustain’. He continues that to protect itself against ‘terrorists, drug smugglers and other international criminals’ that find refuge in ‘failed states’, the USA must now acknowledge its ‘reluctantly’ imperial role in world order, and self-consciously adopt a ‘logic of neo-imperialism’ when dealing with Third World failed states. 9 Some analysts have even suggested that the lack of US Empire was the reason for the 11 September attacks. The Wall Street Journal ’s features editor, Max Boot, argued that ‘the Sept 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation...**US imperialism—a liberal and humanitarian imperialism, to be sure, but imperialism all the same**—appears to have paid off in the Balkan**s’. He continued that the solution for ‘troubled lands’ in the developing world is a ‘sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets’.** 10 According to Stratfor, one of the USA’s leading corporate intelligence firms, ‘Sept 11 created an unintended momentum in US foreign policy that has led directly to empire- building...The United States...is an imperial power, not in the simplistic Leninist sense of seeking markets, but in the classical sense of being unable to secure its safety without controlling others. ’ 11 The US state is thus seen as an imperial state overseeing a global empire which brings benefits to both other Western states and also the inhabitants of war-torn states and regions via the US Empire’s core mission of forcible humanitarian interventions, democracy promotion, and the elimination of global terrorism. These themes have been echoed by US planners themselves. The pre- 9/11 draft 1992 Defense Planning Guidance ( DFG ) paper drawn up by then Under Secretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was sent to military leaders and Defense Department heads to provide them with a geopolitical framework for interpreting the US role in the post-cold war era. The DFG argued that the USA’s ‘first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival’ in the post-cold war era. In so doing the USA should ‘endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia’. 12 Under the office of the current US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, private studies of past great empires have been conducted so as to ascertain ‘how they maintained their dominance’ and what the USA could learn from the ‘successes and failures of ancient powers’. 13 Richard Haass, the director of policy planning at the US Department of State, and the USA’s lead co- ordinator for post-Taliban Afghanistan, openly called for the re-conceptua- lisation of the USA as an imperial power within world order: ‘building and maintaining such an order would require sustained effort by the world’s most powerful actor, the United States. For it to be successful would in turn require that Americans re-conceive their role from one of a traditional nation-state to an imperial power.’ 14 Perhaps the clearest indication of this new imperial discourse, however, was the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy, which echoed the earlier 1992 DFG paper. In it the Bush administration committed itself to building up its military forces to deter any potential rival for world supremacy: ‘Our forces will be **strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build up in the hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States’. 15**

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## Onto

#### Rejecting consequences undermines responsibility, freedom and politics

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A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in international relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. Inthe wilful realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 but it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

## Shunning

#### 2) As global citizens we have a responsibility learn about international moral order – uniquely spills over

**Abdi and Shultz 8** (Ali. A. Professor of education and international development at University of Alberta. Lynette. Associate Professor and Co-Director, Centre for Global Citizenship Education and Research (CGCER). Educating for Human Rights and Global Citizenship. State University of New York Press. 2008. https://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/61591.pdf)//JuneC//

As should be derived from these **horrific problems** of diminished citizenship (and some that may be more benign in their effect on human life) that both the conceptual and practical implications and realities of citizenship should, indeed, be considered in as wide a context as possible. And when we problematize the case, we should see that for all pragmatic undertakings, the contours as well as the corners of denatured citizenship (fragmented, even destroyed—assuming that people are born as free and naturally enfranchised citizens) have so many forms and characteristics that all nonlegal deprivations and suffering could be categorized as lack of citizenship. The fact is that beyond the **millions** who have been killed, there are **billions** who are still alive but whose fundamentalcitizenship rights to education, health, and a viable standard of living have been taken away by those who control access to either state or market resources. In spaces and relationships such as these, citizenship, instead of being created and achieved (see Callan, 1997) is actu- ally being denied, and one can see, as Mamdani (1996) noted, the continu- ing “subjectification” of so many in presumably decolonized landscapes. Indeed, the overall picture is anything but encouraging. As has been abun- dantly reported in recent UN publications, close to half of the world’s popu- lation lives on less than two dollars a day, nearly a billion people cannot read and write, between eight and nine hundred million lack clean drinking water, and an estimated 350 million school-age children do not have access to edu- cation, while, in fact, less than 1 percent of the money spent on weapons could educate all the children in the world. These sites of struggle are collectively an indication of the multicentric nature of the work that is being carried out to address the realities and effects of marginalization, and they lead us to understand the need for a universal approach to human rights. Where some people argue that human rights are particular, necessarily differing according to group and context, we take as a key position that, at many sites, efforts to universalize rights have been the outcome of oppression and the struggle for liberation. The power of the vision and the enactment of universal rights as legal, political, social, cul- tural, and economic entitlements enables marginalized individuals and groups in particular contexts to challenge claims to power by oppressors. Therefore, our position is that universal human rights creates a vision of a world of diversity where all humans have an equitable claim to the rewards and privileges of their social, economic, political, and cultural context. Reporting on the depressing state of the world could continue into many more pages; suffice it to say here that as educators and researchers it is incum- bent upon us to seek a permanent platform for the attainment by all of viable citizenship rights. These rights, while they may not immediately accord us the noble guarantees we need to avoid the likes of Cambodia in the early 1970s or Rwanda in the early 1990s, should at least help us reclaim some relief for the hundreds of millions of our contemporaries who are exposed to malaise and suffering. The potential for human rights as a common vision of human dignity to be the catalyst for change is significant. As one small component of that overall project, this book aims to minimally and initially diffuse the meaning as well as the possible practices of the rights of all citizens across the world. To achieve some measure of this, we should not underestimate the role of education in instilling in the minds of people core human rights values and the sanctity of a global citizenship ethic. Global citizenship aims to expand inclusion and power and provides the ethical and normative framework to make this a legitimate and far-reaching project whereby citizenship is a prod- uct of diversity rather than an institutional tool serving particular groups. This global ethic should affirm, for all of us, that citizenship is not just a mechanism to claim rights that are based on membership in a particular polity, but that human rights are based on membership beyond any state or national boundaries, inherent to all individuals and groups in all places and times. Even in global spaces where fragile or nonexistent states (e.g., Afghanistan, Somalia, Zaire) cannot guarantee the rights of citizens, or in the case where refugees are on the move or located in an “in-between” geographical and political status, people must be still protected by the international community from the per- vasiveness of structural violence.

#### Human rights are prerequisite to peace – root cause and turns the case

**Copelon, 98** (Rhonda Copelon, Professor of Law and Director of the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University of New York School of Law, New York City Law Review, 1998/99, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev. 59)

 **The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War** despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority of the U.S. version of rights, to rebuild popular expectations, and to help develop a culture and jurisprudence of indivisible human rights. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. **It is being broadened** today **by the movements of people** in different parts of the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, **who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival and betterment.** Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. **The emerging rights include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is** imperative **that we bring the human rights framework to bear on** both domestic and **foreign policy.**